The doctrine of limited liability does not apply when death or injury or damage sustained is attributable to the fault or negligence of the shipowner or ship agent or to concurring fault or negligence of the shipowner or ship agent or captain (or patron) of the vessel. Undoubtedly, the shipowner himself, was guilty of such fault or negligence in not making certain that the passenger vessel is not overload, as well as and is having failed to provide sufficient life belts on board the vessel.
a. By “limited liability rule” is meant that the liability of a ship owner for damages in case of loss is limited to the value of the vessel involved. His other properties cannot be reached by the parties entitled to damages.
b. Yes. When the ship owner of the vessel involved is guilty of negligence, the “limited liability rule” does not apply. In such case, the ship owner is liable to the full extent of the damages sustained by the aggrieved parties.
a. Each vessel must bear its own damage. Both of them are at fault.
b. Each of them should bear their respective damages. Since it cannot be determined as to which vessel is at fault. This is under the doctrine of “inscrutable fault”.
c. No party shall be held liable since the cause of the collision is fortuitous event. The carrier is not an insurer.
a. Under the “doctrine of inscrutable fault”, where fault is established but it cannot be determined which of the 2 vessels were at fault, both shall be deemed to have been at fault.
b. Under the “doctrine of limited liability” the exclusively real and hypothecary nature of maritime law operates to limit the liability of the shipowner to the value of the vessel, earned freightage and proceeds of the insurance. However, such doctrine does not apply if the shipowner and the captain are guilty of negligence.
a. The two remaining partners, A and B, are liable. When any partner dies and the business is continued without any settlement of accounts as between him or his estate, the surviving partners are held liable for continuing the business provided that A and B had knowledge or notice of the death of C. (Art. 1841, 1785, par 2, and Art 1833)
b. Creditors can file the appropriate actions, for instance, an action for collection of sum of money against the “partnership at will” and if there are no sufficient funds, the creditors may go after the private properties of A and B (Art 1816). Creditors may also sue the estate of C. The estate is not excused from the liabilities of the partnership even if C is dead already but only up to the time that he remained a partner (Art. 1829, 1835, par 2; Testate Estate of Mota v. Serra, G.R. No. L-22825, February 14, 1925). However, the liability of C’s individual properties shall be subject to the prior payment of his separate debts. (Art. 1835, par 3)
Joe, the capitalist partner, may engage in the restaurant business because it is not the same kind of business the partnership is engaged in. On the other hand, Rudy may not engage in any other business unless their partnership expressly permits him to do so because as an industrial partner he has to devote his full time to the business of the partnership. (Art. 1789)
A should be hired as Secretary. The decision for the hiring of A prevails because it is an act of administration which can be performed by the duly appointed managing partners, W and X.
B cannot be hired, because in case of a tie in the decision of the managing partners, the deadlock must be decided by the partners owning the controlling interest. In this case, the opposition of X and Y prevails because Y owns the controlling interest. (Art. 1801, Civil Code)
a. Under Art. 1830 (1) (c), the dissolution by Patricia and Priscilla is valid and did not violate the contract of partnership even though Pauline and Philip did not consent thereto. The consent of Pauline is not necessary because she had already assigned her interest to Philip. The consent of Philip is not also necessary because the assignment to him of Pauline's interest did not make him a partner, under Art. 1813.
b. NO, Philip has no right to petition for dissolution because he does not have the standing of a partner. (Art. 1813)
a. NO, a conveyance by a partner of his whole interest in a partnership does not of itself dissolve the partnership in the absence of an agreement. (Art. 1813)
b. Justine cannot interfere or participate in the management or administration of the partnership business or affairs. She may, however, receive the net profits to which Una would have otherwise been entitled. In this case, P120, 000. (Art. 1813)
